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SETON HALL UNIVERSITY - FALL SEMESTER, 2011
WHITEHEAD SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL AND
DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

TALKING WITH THE ENEMY:
An Investigation of US Presidential Efforts to Talk with the Enemy
from 1933 to the Present.

Course DIPL 6196 from 4 PM to 6:10 PM on Mondays,
Room to be determined

(

Instructor: Ambassador William Luers former President of the United Nations Association of
the USA (UNA-USA ), former President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and 31 year veteran
of US Foreign Service. In the Foreign Service Mr. Luers served as US Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia ( 1983-1986 ) and Venezuela, ( 1978-1982) and held numerous posts in Italy,
Germany, the Soviet Union, and in the Department of State , where he was the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Europe (1977 1978) and for Inter-American Affairs ( 1975-1977). He also was a
faculty member at Johns Hopkins SAIS ), GW and at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton.
He taught a similar course on “ Talking with the Enemy” at Tufts University in 2009 at
Hamilton College and at SIP A Columbia University in 2010 and 2011. He taught at John C.
Whitehead School for International and Diplomatic Studies at Seton Hall University in the fall
of 2010.

-

Course Description: Through a detailed investigation of a series of case studies, this course will
examine past efforts of President’s of the United States to manage relations with “enemies” or
adversaries. The course will examine the different strategies used by Presidents to enter conflict
or engage in diplomacy (“talking with the enemy”) and explore the various theories connected
with decision making. The course will cover case studies ranging from Roosevelt’s 1933 opening
of relations with the USSR and the decision at Munich to “appease’ Hitler, the decision to drop
the Atomic Bomb up to present day debates over US policy toward North Korea, Libya, Cuba,
and whether the US should talk directly with Iran The course will also consider how the US
might deal with groups in the new paradigm of non-state actors such as Taliban, Hamas, and
Hezbollah.
Key Dates / Deadlines

•

L

•
'

Deadline for agreement with Professor on final paper - November 14
Deadline for submission of the final paper December 16
Deadline for final student consultation - December 5

r

Grade Breakdown
• 25% weekly short paper
• 25% class participation
• 50% final paper
Course Themes: Several key themes will be explored during the course, including:

•

Managing relations with the ‘adversary” or “enemy” has been shaped mainly by the
President himself assisted by trusted and loyal advisers who have not always been the most
experienced and knowledgeable on the nature of the enemy or on the issues involved . Has
this lack of understanding of the enemy led to mistakes and missed opportunities or has
it also on occasion led to creative approaches that were passed up by the professionals?

Departments of government and Congressional leaders have often opposed presidential
policy choices on how best to deal with the enemy . How have the president and his
advisers dealt with this opposition and did the opposition impact the outcome?
How are US decision makers influenced by domestic factors such as elections and the
media? In each case study we will explore to what degree historical and cultural bias or
ignorance has hindered efforts to open up discussions with an adversary when it would have
been in US interest to do so. .

(

What are the different techniques used by the US government for supplementing or
reinforcing direct diplomatic relations?
How often have past President’ s failed adequately to define the objectives for the use of
force and outline an exit strategy when making the decision to use military force rather
than engage an adversary?

Requirements: Students are expected to complete all required reading before each session. For
some sessions the readings are divided into the categories of required and optional.
1 ) Class Work . For each session half of the students (alternating week by week) will write a
short paper of about 400 words related to the session’s readings, except for the first class and for
those class sessions dedicated to a simulation. The class will be divided into two groups in the
opening session of the course for this purpose. The topic to be covered in the papers is described
after the reading for each class. See below. The students writing papers will send them to all the
students in the class and the professor prior to the class. Those students not writing papers ( who
have all the reading also) will ask questions of the paper writers. At least half of the class period
will be devoted to informal interactions among the students about the readings drawing on the
written papers. The professor will add appropriate comments during the discussion. Four times
during the semester the professor will grade the papers and provide feedback to each student on
the student’s class work .

L

2) A 15 page research paper on a subject of the student’s choosing related to the theme of
the course will be due at the end of the semester. Each student will discuss ideas for the paper
and agree on the topic with the professor. The paper should establish at the outset a proposition
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about a specific Presidential decision ( for example how was it arrived at, did it further US
interests, were there unanticipated consequences, did the President take or not take the advice of
the best informed advisers, did the decision achieve what it was designed to achieve, did the
President’s domestic political considerations seem overriding, etc). The paper will support and
explain the proposition. This paper will require original source research with footnotes or
endnotes. Should students fail to submit their paper on time, without full agreement with the
professor on the need for a delay, the paper will be marked down as a delay penalty.

3) Preparation for Following Week . The last 15 minutes of each class will be devoted to a
student briefing for the next class. Two students will make presentations to the class. One
student will describe the narrative from the US point of view of the current state of US thinking
and recent history of the relations with the adversary, including what the US wants out of the
relationship. The other student will describe the narrative from the point of view of the adversary
and the recent history of relations, including what the adversary wants out of the relationship. In
the first session of the class each will take the role they would want to play . There should be
about 20 roles given the fact that there will be two for each class. Each student will make one
presentation. .

(

4) Simulations of presidential decisions will be organized for two or three sessions during the
semester. These simulations are designed to replicate a decision making meeting with the
president leading toward a final decision. Each student will play the role of a real individual in a
meeting of the cabinet or the National Security Council. The class will elect by secret ballot the
student who will play President Obama for each simulation. For the fall semester the simulations
will deal with Iran and either North Korea and current issue in the Middle East such as Libya.
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Monday, September 12, 2011

The Setting for the Course - Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
The approaches that Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson took toward US foreign relations in
the early 20th Century serve as book ends for how US presidents have dealt with the “enemy.”
This class will explore the difference between these two approaches and the role of the debate
between “realists” and the Wilsonian policy makers in shaping US foreign relations and
presidential decisions. This first session will also review the unusual American reluctance to use
diplomatic relations as a routine tool to do the business of states and to defend American
security. In addition to becoming familiar with these two American presidents and trends that
have shaped the thinking of virtually every subsequent US president, the class will discuss some
of the theories behind the decision making approach to the study of history and political science.
This will not be a theory based course but the professor has sought to include in the readings
some material on decision making theory. .
Readings:

•

(

Berridge, G .R . “Talking to the Enemy: How States Without ' Diplomatic Relations '
Communicate " (1994).
Required: pp. xiii-12

Morris, Edmund, Colonel Roosevelt , 2010, Required Chapter 23 pp 441-460

•

Cooper, John Milton, “Woodrow Wilson”, 2009
Required: Prologue pp 3 12 and Chapter 22 pp 507-534

•

Thomas, Evan, “The War Lovers”, 2010.
Required : Introduction Chapter ( pages 3 13) and Chapter 23 ( pages 397 - 413). This is a
recently published popular history of three men (Teddy Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and
William Randolph Hearst) who shaped one aspect of the American presidential attitude
toward conflict and the “enemy” in subsequent decades.

-

-

Class Preparation: Collect your thoughts on “what is an enemy” and on why you have chosen
to take this course. One of the teams selected in this first class will be asked to prepare a briefing
for the end of the second class on the background setting for the Munich Agreement .
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Monday, September 19, 2011

.

Changing Relations with the Soviet Union

The establishment of relations with USSR in 1933 was a presidentially managed undertaking
between the US and a large adversarial state despite opposition from members of the cabinet
including from the Department of State and from prominent members of the US Congress This
session will examine Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to open relations with the USSR at the
beginning of the era of Stalin’s Great Terror. Roosevelt had determined it was in US interests to
do so.
Students will read an article outlining some of the main factors that have influenced individual
decision- makers in U .S. foreign policy throughout recent history, as well as a short piece
introducing the ways in which the U.S. has traditionally talked with its “enemies.” This article
briefly outlines the difference between non-recognition and a breach in diplomatic relations.
Readings:

•

(

Bennett, Edward M. “ Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet
Relations, 1933-1939.” { 1985)
Required: pp. 1 -24

Rosati, Jerel A, “The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics"
Required: Entire, International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (autumn, 2000), pp. 45-75.
Bishop, Donald G. “The Roosevelt - Litvinov Agreements: The American View” (1965),
Required: pp. 1 -26

Baer, George W. " A Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Diplomatic Relations:
The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson” (1986),
Required: pp. 227 -243

-

Farnsworth , B. “William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union” (1967 ) . Required reading ( pp 89
115

Class Preparation : Prepare a short paper (300 words) asking a question about the reading or
making an observation about a particular issue that you found interesting or provocative. The
professor will use the student’s questions and observations as a basis for class discussion. In the
final 15 minutes of the session the designated first team will brief the class on setting for the
Munich/Nazi Germany session for the next week .

5

r

Monday, September 26 , 2011

The Munich Agreement - 1938

Even though President Roosevelt was not a direct party to the Munich agreement with Hitler in
1938, he played a key role in bringing Britain, France, and Italy to the negotiating table with
Hitler and in convincing them not to break off discussions. As in the case of recognition of the
Soviet Union in 1933, domestic factors such as isolationist tendencies and a strong U.S. desire
for peace colored and shaped Roosevelt’s behavior in light of the crisis. This event conditioned
American leaders on how not to “deal with the enemy”. The “Munich appeasement” shaped the
thinking of American presidents on dealing with adversaries for decades.
Readings:

(

•

Farnham, Barbara Rearden, “ Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political
Decision-Making" (1997)
Required: pp. 91-128

•

Munich Pact, September 29, 1938 ( primary document )

•

YOUTUBE "The Munich betrayal 1938"
www. voutube.com /watch?v-nZHpprf6HSM&feature-related

•

Bennett, Edward M. “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet
Relations, 1933-1939." ( 1985)
Required : pp 127 152

•

Dallek, Robert. " Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945” (1995)
Required: pp. 144-168

•

Reynolds, David, “Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century” (2007),
Chapter ’’Munich 1938” , Required pp 37 - 102

Class Preparation: Write a short OPED for the NY Times (400 words) giving your view as
though you were a contemporary observer of foreign policy September 1938, only days after the
Munich Agreement was announced . You might want to comment in your OPED on why
President Roosevelt supported the Munich Pact and on the attitudes of other Americans or
Europeans toward Munich. We will discuss OPED drafting in the second class. At the end of the
class one of the teams will brief the class on the historic setting for the dropping of the fist
nuclear bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.
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Monday, October 3 , 2011

Hiroshima and the End of World War II - 1945

The controversy over President Truman’s decision to drop the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima
in August of 1945 continues to be debated among historians and analysts of presidential decision
making. Some “ revisionist” historians have argued that President Truman was fully aware of a
Japanese offer for a peace settlement in the summer of 1945 so that the bomb was not necessary .
The conventional history suggests that the conditions suggested by the Japanese for their
surrender were unacceptable and the alternatives were either to prolong the war which would
include the invasion of Japan and the loss of possibly millions of lives or drop the bomb. The
moral argument against using the atomic bomb has also loomed over that decision. In this case
study, students will examine current interpretations of this controversial decision and read some
of the new material that has come to light from recently declassified messages. We will examine
which of Truman’s main advisers were most critical in moving President Truman to that decision

•

-

Bernstein, Barton J„ " Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941 1945 : A
Reinterpretation" Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 90, no. 1 Spring 1975,
Required: pp. 23 69

-

(

•

Frank, Richard B ” Ending the Pacific War; Harry Truman and the Decision to Drop the
Bomb" . Foreign Policy Research Institute. (April 2009) vol. 14, no. 4. Required reading.

•

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, “ Racing the Enemy" , Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2005 )
Required : Chapter 4: Potsdam: The Turning Point ( pp. 130 178)
Required: Chapter 5 : The Atomic Bombs ( pp. 177 214)
Optional: Conclusion: Assessing the Roads Not Taken ( pp. 290 -303)

-

-

•

The Potsdam Proclamation ( primary document )

•

YOUTUBE “Harry S Truman's announcement on Bombing of Hiroshima
www.voutube.com/ watch? v-POPmlHlaOtM& feature-related

•

YOUTUBE “President Truman on Nuclear Decision in WWII”
www.youtube.com / watch ?v = 9Q01FURCY8g

Class Preparation : Write a 300 word statement of your view on Truman’s going forward with
the plans to drop the bomb on Hiroshima. Did Truman make the right decision? Did he actually
make the decision? If not Truman, then who? One of the teams will brief the class on the
historical setting for the Korean War leading up to the truce.

October 10 there will be no class because of fall break

7
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Monday, October 17 , 2011
Agreement on a Truce That Suspended the Korean War - 1953

In 1953 President Eisenhower made the decision, after two years of troubled negotiations, to
reach a truce, without a peace treaty, to end the war on the Korean peninsula. The stalemate in
the war and the high cost of life, plus the general world environment about this costly and
seemingly un-winnable war caused President Eisenhower to take the unusual step to stop the
fighting. The terms of the truce left a heritage of conflict on that peninsula that has remained a
factor of stability in that part of the world for decades. Indeed one of the objectives of any
settlement that might be reached between the US and North Korea and between the two Koreas
would most certainly have to be a final Peace Treaty formally closing that war. We will explore
the decision that the president made and the considerations that went into this unusual truce.
Readings

(

.

•

Stueck, William “Origins of the Korean War.” (pp. 10 - 46). The Korean War 1995

•
•

Stueck, William . “ Diplomacy Fails.” (pp. 85 - 105). The Korean War

•

Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 7: The Strategy for Ending the War” ( pp. 204 - 231 ) The
Wrong War 1985

•
•
•

Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 8: Conclusions (pp. 232 - 246). The Wrong War 1985

Stueck, William. “Concluding an Armistice.” (pp. 341-347). The Korean War 1995

•

NSC-147, “Analysis of Possible Outcomes of Action in Korea” April 2, 1953

•

“Public Opinion Polling Korea” June 1953

Hess, Gary “Truman as Commander in Chief’ ( pp. 42 - 74) in Presidential Decisions for
War (OPTIONAL)

Cummings, Bruce, Chapter 9: Requiem: History in the Temper of Reconciliation” ( pp
225 243), The Korean War 2010 (OPTIONAL)

-

Class Preparation: Read the required reading. Prepare a 500 word “opinion editorial” for the
New York Times that takes a position on whether the Korean Armistice was the correct,

incorrect or take another position in between . One of the teams will brief the class on the
historical context of the session on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

0
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Monday, October 24, 2011

-

Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

The Cuban missile a crisis in 1962 is one of the best documented and fully assessed decisions by
a president on the decision for or against the use of force. This session will explore the recent
literature on the decision making process and test the themes on what we can learn from the
process that led President Kennedy opt against the use of force against Cuba. We will explore the
qualities of the president’s closest advisers (the “Excom ), the role of outside advisers, and the
experience and attitudes the president himself brought to his decision;
Reddings

Freedman, Lawrence, " Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam" ( 2000),
Required: Chapters 19 - 23, pp. 170 - 217
Blight, J .G., J .S. Nye, D.A . Welch , "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, " Foreign Affairs 66
(1987),
Required : pp. 170 - 188

•
(

Allison, Graham & Zelikov, Philip, “ Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis " (1999),
Required: pp 1 -12 and pp 379- 407
Allison, Graham, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Political
Science Review, Sept 1969 Vol LXIII , No 3

/
•

V

Kennedy Tapes: inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis" edited by
Ernest May and Philip Zdik©w; (2002),
)
Optional : pp. 107 122 /

" The

CCj

Film " Seventeen Days "

Class Preparation: We will try to organize a showing of the film otherwise each student should
try to see it. Each member of the class should prepare to be one of the real members of the
Excom. You will each explain your perspective on what should US government policy should be
and why on the 15th Day of the crisis. Still in your role as a member of the Excom you will also
lh
prepare a 300 page confidential memorandum to the President dated on the 15 day of the Crisis
that gives him your private criticism of the suggestion and point of view of another member of
the Excom . At the end of the discussion one of the teams will provide a briefing on the decision
to Americanize the War in Vietnam .

9
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Monday, October 31 2011
The Decision to Americanize the War in Vietnam

Vietnam was the formative US foreign policy venture after WWII. There were times when better
choices could have been made instead of further escalation of the military conflict - choices that
were not taken , involving dealing in a different way with adversaries. In preparation for this class
students will be asked to read books on the role of McNamara and McGeorge Bundy who were
key protagonists in Johnson’s decision to keep escalating the US military presence in Vietnam .
We will examine the particular role of these two advisers and try to determine their reasons for
making recommendations in 1965 that brought about President Johnson’s decision to deploy US
combat troops to Vietnam and to continue to escalate the war.
Readings:

•

Goldstein, Gordon M. “ Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in
Vietnam ” (2008)
Required : Chapters 3 5 ( pp. 97 - 185)

-

<

•

McNamara, Robert “ In Retrospect : The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam" (1995)
Required : Chapter 6 and 7 ( pp. 145 206)

•

Ball, George W. The Past Has Another Pattern (1973) Chapters 24 and 25 ( pp 360-403)

•

FILM: “ The Fog of War, ” Robert McNamara

-

Class Preparation: The professor will work with the class to set up a debate on the decisions in
1964-65 that led to the significant increase in American troops in Vietnam . The time will be
selected in January or February 1965 , Group A will argue for President Johnson’s decision to
increase troops and Team B will argue against the decision to significantly increase US ground
forces in Vietnam . In addition each of you will be asked to write a Memorandum to The
President from one of the actors in the Johnson Administration of about 400 words, giving your
recommendations on what the President should do about the US role in Vietnam . This
memorandum does not have to take the position you will be required to take in the debate. One
team will brief the class on the historical setting for the next session on China.

L.
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Monday , November 7 , 2011

-

Changing Relations with China 1972

The style that Nixon/Kissinger used in opening up the relations with China in 1972 and the
timing of that initiative are instructive for future state-state relations, such as evolving US-Iran
relations today. Note that the Nixon initiative found a response in China, which was in the
middle of the Cultural Revolution arguably one of the most repressive periods of Mao’s China.
This session will address how the president made his decision with a small group of advisers
and, like in the case of Roosevelt in 1933, with opposition from the Department of State. The
new relationship helped the US learn about and understand China far better than before through
dealing with the Chinese officials and interacting with Chinese society at many levels even
before the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Readings

<

-

•

The Joint U.S. China Communique, Shanghai, February 27, 1972 ( primary document )

•

McMillan, Margaret " Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World" (2007)
Required: Chapters 12-14 (pp. 184- 230)

•

Ross, Robert S. “ International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U.S. -China Relations
since 1972 (1986), Optional: pp. 255-287

.
•
•

Accinelli , Robert, " In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi: The Taiwan Issue and Sino-American
Rapprochement 1969 1972” , Required: Chapter 1 ( pp 32-55)

-

-

Talks with Chou En Lai, " Top Secret Memorandum: Henry A. Kissinger to Nixon. July
14, 1971. Required Reading. This is an exceptional document from the archives written by
Kissinger for the President.
" My

YOUTUBE " History: Feb 1972 President Nixon's Visit to China (3/6) 1972/2/21"
http://www.youtube.com/watch7v~XUMkl 81 xVw4&feature-related

•

YOUTUBE Chinese Footage, "Chairman Mao Zedong and Nixon
www. youtube.com /watch?v:=ahWLRV-Kblc&feature-related

•

YOUTUBE Nial Ferguson's "Nixon in China":
http:// www, voutube.com /watch?v = N 5 V9sP nDCM&feature=related

Class Preparation: Write a 300 word statement on who was most responsible for the decision to
open to China and who in Nixon’s cabinet was opposed or uninformed and why. One of the
teams will brief the class on the Nixon Brezhnev Summit in 1973 and on the Regan/Gorbachev
summit in Reykjavik.

12
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Monday, November 14, 2011

DETENTE - The Nixon/ Brezhnev Summit in DC 1973 and the Reagan /Gorbachev
Summit at Reykjavik in 1988.
The Nixon administration went into the 1973 summit with the strategic opening to China in
place, a wide range of proposals to broaden relations with the Soviet Union in arms control and
other areas, and a re-elected President beginning his second administration. The climate for this
experienced Nixon/Kissinger team at one level was positive. Yet there was growing domestic
opposition to detente with the Soviet Union at home and the US was looking at withdrawing
from the poorly progressing war in Vietnam . Most importantly the Watergate allegations were
building against Nixon, creating the beginning of a crisis year for the President which would
increasingly cast a shadow over his presidency. The agreements at the 1973 summit meeting
reflected many of the aspirations and the worries of President Nixon.
Reagan became President truly believing that the Soviet Union was the evil empire. He knew
little about his opposite number in the Kremlin and did little to learn about him. Yet as he began
to address the threat of nuclear war and particularly after Gorbachev became General Secretary,
Reagan warmed to talking to the Soviet leadership. His summit with Gorbachev in Reykjavik
was both a historic leap in US-Soviet relations and a serious setback demonstrating the still
uncertain ground of distrust and misunderstanding as each side “talked to the enemy.”

(

Readings;

Home, Alistair " Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year” (2008)
Required : Chapter 7

Garthoff, Raymond L" Detente and Confrontation: American - Soviet Relations from
Nixon to Reagan" ( 1994 )
Required ; Chapter 9&10: pp. 325 -403
Matlock, Jack F. “ Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended ” (2004)
Required Chapters 10& 11 pp 215 250

-

Farnham, Barbara, “ Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of
Threat ” , Political Science Quarterly; Volume 116 (2), 2001 Required : pp 225-252.

Reynolds, David, “Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century”, Chapter
“ Moscow 1972” Optional: (pp 223- 282). The 1972 Summit laid the groundwork for
Detente and this is a good description of that earlier summit. The professor has chosen to
look at the 1973 summit in view of the significant steps taken and in view of the domestic
clouds about Watergate that were influencing President Nixon’s decisions He has also
chosen 1973 since he had been working on Soviet Affairs in the Dept of State during that
summit.

L
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Class Preparation: Prepare a brief (300 word) memorandum contrasting the way Nixon and
Reagan dealt with the Soviet leader during these landmark summits toward the end of the Cold
War. One of the teams will brief the class on the historical setting for the Two Iraq Wars and the
two Bushes handling of these two different wars against Iraq

(

14
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Monday, November 21 , 2011

The Two Iraq Wars and the Two Bushes - 1990 and 2003

In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 of Kuwait, President GHW Bush mounted a US
effort to develop international support for action against Iraq for its violation of the UN Charter
and the threat this invasion signified for regional security and particularly for the security of
Saudi Arabia. This action drew the widespread approval of the world community and much of
the cost was paid for by countries in the neighborhood . President Bush’s decision included an
agreement to set limited objectives for the war in order to get international backing and in order
not to have a prolonged commitment to dealing with Iraq ’s internal problems . The Gulf War did
not lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein.
A decade later President GW Bush came into office apparently determined to take military action
against Saddam Hussein and 9/ 11 produced the rationale for that invasion. It is difficult to pin
point a moment when the President GW Bush took the final decision to go to war, what were the
reasons for the invasion and what were the specific objectives for the military action. It was
unclear what event or situation would determine when US forces could withdraw. This session
will seek to compare the different ways in which the two Presidents Bush approached decision
making and managed conflict.

Readings:

(

L

•

Frankel, Glenn, “ Lines in the Sand” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, September
10, 1990 Required

•

YOUTUBE George H W Bush Announces War Against Iraq (January 16 1991 )
www . youtube .com / watch? v-IFrnOHaOWoA&feature= PlavList&p=C5 Fl 041 D6C9CCDE0
&index

•

Yetiv, Steve A. US- Decision Making and the Persian Gulf War (2004)
Required: " Rational Actor Model ", p30 57,
Required : Elements of Groupthink on the Road to War" pi 04 112)

-

-

•

Hitchens, Christopher. Realpoltik in the Gulf: A game gone tilt , Jan 1991 Harper’s Required

•

Packer, George. “The Assassin ’s Gate: America in Iraq ”(2005)
Required : Chapter 2: Fevered Minds, pp. 39-65. The professor strongly recommends this
chapter to understand the ideological underpinnings of the second Iraq war. The degree to
which ideology actually played a defining role in the decision to go to war and the execution
of that war is a controversial part of understanding the war and its outcome.

•

Fallows, James, " Blind Into Baghdad ," The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/Feb 2004. Required

*

Dobbins, James, "Who Lost Iraq ? Foreign Affairs, Sept /Oct, 2007 Required

15

r

*

Haas, Richard N “ War of Necessity ; War of Choice, a Memoir of Two Iraq Wars’ (2009)
Required : Ch 9 and appendix 1 ( pp 267-293)

Class Preparations : Write a short paper (300 words) comparing the decision making styles and
The approach of GHW Bush and GW Bush with respect to the preparation and execution of their
Iraq wars. What were the similarities and differences between their approaches to working with
Allies, with the UN, with the US Congress and American people, and with the enemy Saddam
Hussein? At the end of the class a team will provide the background of US-Cuban relations and
the setting for the Obama administration’s policy toward Cuba.

(
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Monday, November 28, 2011

The Simulation of a Critical Presidential Decision — Iran
Iran challenges the US Government to manage diplomatically and politically several issues in the
new international order, including: ( 1 ) the potential and real conflict or competition between
Islam and the West over Middle East and other issues, (2) the management of non-proliferation
and nuclear power in this new age, and (3) the relations of state power to non State actors
(terrorists), particularly in the volatile regions of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the
Subcontinent. In the case of Iran, these complex issues must be discussed against a backdrop of
deep mutual distrust and profound misunderstandings exacerbated by the lack of contact . This
session will be a simulation of the challenges to the President in seeking to shape a US policy
that will be effective and not bring unacceptable unanticipated consequences. .

-

Readings

(

•

Luers, Pickering and Walsh, " How to Deal with Iran “ The New York Review of Books,
February 12, 2009 pp 45 48

•

Freedman, Lawrence. “ A Choice of Emmies: America Confronts the Middle East. ’’ (2008).
Required: Chapter 4: Revolution in Iran. pp. 62-84

•

United States Institute of Peace and the Stimson Center, “Engagement, Coercion, and Iran’s
Nuclear Challenge”, Report of a Joint Taskforce on US-Iran Policy, Nov 16, 2010. Required

•

Additional up-to-date readings will be recommended when closer to the simulation.

-

Class Preparation: Do additional reading to prepare for the role you will play of a real person
attending the NSC meeting on Iran in November 2011. There will be no writing
assignment for this class. One member of the class will serve as President Obama and each of the
other senior advisers will be represented by one class member. In the simulation the individual
class members should seek to adhere as closely as possible to the policy recommendations and
points of view that the actual person (Secretary Clinton, Secretary Panetta etc) would have to
represent given the position each holds and the establishment each represents. One of the teams
will be called on to brief the class on the setting of US policy toward “terrorist groups” such as
Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in preparation for
a class discussion on revising US policy toward these and other non-state actors. This team will
also lead the development of a current reading list on this subject matter for the next class.

17

r

Monday, December 5 , 2011

What should US policy be in relation to the non-state actors such as Hamas , Hezbollah ,
Taliban and Muslim Brotherhood ?
This session will be a structured discussion of what each student would recommend to the
President to deal with the new category of “Enemies” non state actors such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

-- -

This session will discuss in the context of an internal US Government debate including some
outside experts over how the US should approach dealings with the new players in the Islamic
World .
The students in the class will participate in developing a reading list for this subject.

(

Class Preparation: In advance of the class 5 “expert” outside advisors will be appointed who
will make the case for a changed policy toward each of the major non-state actors and two
experts will be selected to argue against any basic change of policy. These outside experts will
brief the President with some of his principal advisors such as the NSC advisor, Secretary of
State, Defense, and Homeland Security plus various other actors such as the CIA head. Finally
one of the teams will prepare for the final class simulation .
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Monday , December 12 , 2011

The Simulation of a critical Presidential Decision: Either North Korea or a current
decision being considered in the Muslim world , such as Libya

IF KOREA IS THE SUBJECT: The search over how to deal with talk to or use force - with
North Korea has gone on longer than the efforts to deal with Iran. Really since the cessation of
hostilities in the Korean War, American presidents and the leaders of South Korea and other
nations in the area have tried in vain to develop a policy that would work to reduce North
Korea’s threats to the region, that would attract them into the rapidly developing world around
them , and that would eventually lead to a peace treaty that could put an end to the Korean War
and open a new era for peace in the Korean peninsula. The tensions over the policies of this
outcast nation have troubled virtually every US administration over the past 50 years. The class
will simulate a summit meeting between the US, South Korea, Japan, China and the USSR with
each team playing the role of one of those five states.

(

Class Preparation: The reading for this class is likely to come from articles and public reports
that have yet to be written . The professor will provide the list of recommended readings at least
one month prior to the simulation. However since each team will be representing a different
national perspective on this problem , individual team players will want to seek out their own
sources to prepare for the simulation. Within each team, specific individual roles will be
assigned. In the case of the US there will be Obama, Clinton, the President’s special
representative on Korea (Steve Bosworth ), and probably either the Secretary of Defense or
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Counterparts will be selected for each of the other nations.
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